Seeing global justice in terms of human rights
It is now increasingly commonplace, in the philosophical literature on global justice and human rights, to follow Thomas Pogge in holding that the systemic effects of the present global institutional order violate or leave unfulfilled the human rights of billions of people. 1 I certainly do not wish to dispute Pogge's compelling argument that the current 1 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (2 nd ed. New York, Polity, 2008) . While Pogge's position is currently the most widely visible, Henry Shue's Basic Rights (2 nd ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980) has also been extremely influential 3 global order is grossly unjust. What I wish to challenge is the assumption that this injustice is best characterised with reference to the unfulfilment or violation of human rights.
It is not hard to see why so many current global justice theorists might find an appeal to human rights attractive. Global justice theorists are concerned about the atrophy of cosmopolitan sentiment in modern liberal societies, 2 to which the supposedly global reach of human rights talk provides a solution that is effective both domestically and internationally. Thus Pogge, seeking a standard of justice that is at once fine-grained and internationally politically effective, asserts that 'a conception of human rights is far more suitable than all the theoretical constructs currently discussed by academics '. 3 Global justice theorists frequently echo this belief in the political effectiveness of human rights talk. It is claimed that 'for a growing number of people of all cultures in all regions' human rights provide 'attractive remedies' to injustice; 4 indeed, that human rights constitute a modern 'lingua franca ', 5 or 'world culture ', 6 'the common moral language' of 'peacetime global society' insofar as there is one. 
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My aim in this paper is to raise the possibility that others elsewhere may see the injustices of the global institutional order in ways very different to the global justice theorists' view. This is not a disagreement over whether the global order is unjust, but a disagreement over the nature of the injustice. I shall suggest that in post-colonial contexts of political activity the unjust effects of the global institutional order may take on a hue coloured far more by local historical narratives of injustice than by human rights talk. To bring out the structure of such thinking, I shall focus on one particular case, that of the New Zealand Māori. The middle sections of my paper are given over to a lengthy account of how and why Māori prefer to avoid human rights talk when making claims of right. In the construction I will place on Māori thinking, this is because human rights talk appears, to Māori, as one thought too many. We can of course ask whether Māori are reasonable to hold to such thinking. I argue that an historically grounded answer to this question should be an affirmative one, and that the sorts of considerations that make reasonable the Māori avoidance of human rights talk are likely to be present in many other post-colonial contexts. concerns. There is a concern from the philosophical side, that our most plausible understanding of human rights should be fundamentally grounded in the most important or vital human needs and interests -the 'morality of the depths', in Henry Shue's oft-quoted phrase 10 -and that too long and trivial a list of human rights becomes unmoored from this. But there is also a concern that too long and trivial a list of human rights will damagingly dilute the weighty political currency that human rights currently have. It is no accident that the standard philosophical justifications seek to preserve the political effectiveness of human rights talk.
Claims about the political effectiveness of, and the philosophical justification for, human rights also intersect at a deeper level. The political effectiveness of human rights talk is often taken to reflect, and be explained by, a considerable consensus on substantive moral conclusions. 11 Justifications for the philosophical idea of human rights also typically make use of a substantive consensus. Differing justificatory strategies locate and characterise this consensus in different ways, depending on whether the grounds for the philosophical idea of human rights are given by (for example) the deliverances of ordinary moral reasoning; 12 or of an overlapping consensus on values; 13 interpretive reconstruction of existing human rights practice. 14 The latter two strategies must appeal to such a consensus: overlapping consensus arguments obviously rely on it, while interpretative strategies must begin with assumed agreement on 'paradigmatic instances' of -and thus some sense of the point and purpose of -the institutions or practices to be interpretatively reconstructed. 15 Appeals to 'ordinary moral reasoning' need not invoke consensus if grounded in a sufficiently robust moral realism, but many such appeals do invoke consensus. This is to say that vindications for the philosophical idea of human rights often proceed from the assertion that certain basic needs or values capture a common human consensus on what matters most. An extreme, though revealing, example is Jonathan Wolff's recent assertion that 'a great deal of political philosophy is now settled' by the practical consensus on human rights. 16 Not everyone may want to go quite that far, but it is significant here that even critics of expansively cosmopolitan accounts of global justice allow that a minimal cosmopolitan position can be grounded in consensus on human rights. 17 One consequence of this deep intersection between claims about the justification for human rights as a philosophical idea and claims about the political effectiveness of human rights talk is that it is very hard to see how, following the standard justificatory strategy, one could even register the ways in which claims about the global political effectiveness of human rights talk could be overstated. My main concern here is to raise the possibility that global justice theorists are too quick to assume that global injustices are best characterised through the language of human rights. But I shall also gesture to 14 For example, Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights; Raz, "Human Rights Without Foundations"; and Andrea Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality", 16:2, 2008, 137-164. 15 Sangiovanni, "Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality", 148. 16 Wolff, "The Demands of the Human Right to Health", 220. the further conclusion that, precisely because the standard justificatory strategy cannot register such overstatements, we should rethink that strategy.
Journal of Political Philosophy

Human Rights Talk as a Mode of Legitimation
To think about the political effectiveness of human rights talk is to think of human rights as what I shall call a mode of legitimation. As Quentin Skinner once rightly observed, 'any course of action will be inhibited to the degree that it cannot be legitimised. Any principle that helps to legitimise a course of action will therefore be among the enabling Sociologie 48, 2007, 173-189. there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel'. 20 The constraints on what might stand as a mode of legitimation are contingent, determined by what is already there in existing traditions of political activity as they play out in current contexts. 21 The existence of any specific mode of legitimation in any given context of political activity is therefore determined solely by the fact that its operation is recognised, by agents in the relevant context, as being effective.
With all this in mind, there is no doubt that human rights talk has come to represent a powerful mode of legitimation in many contexts of political activity. Yet while global justice theorists are keen to emphasise the effectiveness of human rights talk as a mode of legitimation, the way they do so is marked by a number of elisions. The human rights mode is invariably presented in isolation, both from the particular conditions in the 1970s within which the mode came to have the effectiveness it now enjoys, 22 and from any other modes of legitimation that may be present in actual contexts of political activity. Accordingly, global justice theorists do not ask whether the conditions that make human rights an effective mode in some contexts apply in all current contexts, or whether other modes interact with the human rights mode in ways that limit its effectiveness. In post-colonial contexts I think it quite likely that other modes will have this limiting effect, and I want to emphasise the point by focussing on contemporary Māori political argument in New Zealand. To do this I will be speaking of Māori, who are of course the indigenous population of New Zealand, and also of Pākehā, the name by which New Zealanders of European extraction typically refer to themselves. I do not choose to focus on the Māori context out of any desire to put Māori thinking on some kind of "exotic" pedestal, but simply because it is the context I am most familiar with.
Human rights as one thought too many
It is unwise to generalise too much about Māori political argument, and the following remarks are a tentative attempt by one Pākehā observer to understand only the Māori tendency to avoid appeals to the human rights mode of legitimation. This avoidance is Huia, Wellington, 2003) , which is -although Mead does not stress the point explicitlya detailed meditation on the extent to which Māori culture is more liberal than it was. 10 that establishes a spiritual link between the land and the child. Once born the child inherits a number of rights called a birthright. 24 Mead is not simply describing a traditional Māori view. He is making a contemporary argument, appealing to the genealogical links that ground a bundle of fundamental and inalienable rights each and every Māori possesses by birthright. These are basic entitlements that all others, including governments and the law, must as a matter of justice respect.
Consider second, the claimants' arguments in the Waitangi Tribunal's Whanganui River Report. There one will find Māori claims of right to the river invoking the river's existence as an independent metaphysical being with its own mauri (lifeforce), invoking the whakapapa (genealogy) links that bind this entity to the local iwi * , and insisting that these genealogical ties mean that the mana † of the local iwi is complexly interpenetrated with the mana of the river itself and of its resident taniwha (sacred water creatures). Traditionally hapu were the main social unit in Māori society; in the last century iwi have become so. † Mana is a complex moral concept, possessed of individuals, groups, and both natural and supernatural entities. One's mana is a fundamental part of one's identity, describing one's worth, status, integrity, charisma, and influence. Mana also denotes authority, control, and jurisdiction; and is a fundamental aspect of the traditional Māori understanding of agency. There is a strongly metaphysical aspect to mana, expressed in the numerous ways the concept connects to that of tapu (roughly: the sacred or forbidden). 25 Waitangi Tribunal, Whanganui River Report, (Wai-167, Wellington, GP Publications, 1999), ch. 2.
All of this amounts to a claim of authority over the river, of which Māori have been systematically dispossessed since the onset of the colonial period.
The thinking underlying these rights claims is well-captured by Moana Jackson:
In general terms, the rights of tāngata whenua ‡ share the same concerns as those rights which the United Nations affirms... What makes them specific is the fact that... [the Māori set of rights] clearly exists and has a validity independent of international law. It is inherent in Māori law, in the concept of rangatiratanga * , and in the poetry of our whakataukī or proverbs. 26 In making this point, Jackson is insisting that the justificatory grounds and validity of Māori claims of right to land, to resources, and to political authority and access to social institutions (rangatiratanga covers all these things 27 ) rest, and should be seen as resting, solely on distinctively Māori considerations. And that is typically what Māori claims of right do rest on.
Māori arguments consistently assert a set of rights held uniquely by Māori, recognition of which must form the core of any just institutional arrangement for post-contact times. ‡ Tāngata whenua being a typical Māori expression referring to Māori as a group. Tāngata = "people"; whenua = "land", also "placenta", thereby neatly expressing the genealogical tie to the land that Māori have. * Rangatiratanga = (roughly) in modern usage, the rights and authority Māori should as a matter of justice have; the existence of a sphere of affairs in which Māori authority should be, if not supreme, very significant. Traditionally, rangatiratanga = the way of going on characteristic of a chief, including the rights and authority he or she possesses (rangatira = chief). This way of putting things may sound as though there is no serious conflict between the whakapapa mode and the human rights mode: the justification for the claim that Māori suffered injustice is simply over-determined. Bernard Williams's readers will know better. The phrase "one thought too many" is deployed by Williams to mark considerations of reasoning that are inappropriate in light of the correct reasons for action. 34 One might (in the case Williams discusses) save one's wife from drowning, rather than a drowning stranger, simply because she is your wife, or because one must always maximise the best consequences and in this case it turns out that saving one's wife achieves that. The first mode of reasoning is correct, and grasping this shows the second, overly impartial, mode of reasoning to be inappropriate. I think something similar is going on when Māori avoid human rights talk. A sophisticated conception of human rights will include respect for culture, so that respect for human rights necessarily involves respect for mana and rangatiratanga. But the problem remains: justice will still appear only indirectly concerned, in virtue of human rights, with Māori mana and rangatiratanga. There is still one thought too many. The only modes of legitimation that can actually capture what it is Māori demand are the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation and those that can be successfully bent to its shape. The human rights mode of legitimation is not one of those, and that I suspect is why Māori avoid it.
Can human rights reasonably be one thought too many?
So what should we say about this? The first thing to say is that in Williams's drowning wife scenario, it matters that the perspective from which we can see that there is 'one thought too many' in overly impartial forms of reasoning is the perspective of someone who understands the right reasons for action. This thought raises, in a rather stark way, the question of whether the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is reasonable. Human rights talk only appears as one thought too many from the standpoint of the whakapapa However, there is also a question about the sorts of considerations we allow to bear on the question of whether the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is reasonable. It may seem attractive to take a very short line and reject as unreasonable the Māori insistence on deploying the whakapapa mode, by appeal to either the moral truth of human rights or to a stringently Rawlsian prohibition on richly metaphysical arguments. Yet these sorts of responses are too quick: they treat the question as a philosophical one (which it obviously is) without allowing that it is also a political one (which it also obviously is).
The question of whether Māori are unreasonable to avoid human rights talk must have an historically-grounded answer, by which I mean we must take account of what the question presupposes about the agents, and their histories, we are asking it of. What it 35 I take the idea of a conceptual last stand from Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope (Cambridge presupposes is that the Māori need not see historical and continuing injustice in terms drawn from the whakapapa worldview. And in a sense this is true. The animist, genealogical worldview of whakapapa is not the only option Māori now have for understanding the world, and indeed they need to spend considerable energy in maintaining this option as a live one.
It is important to register the fact that it is only now a contingent matter, in a way that it was not then, that Māori perceive injustice in the way they do. 36 Māori at the initial point of contact and colonisation could scarcely have seen the injustices that befell them in any terms other than those of the whakapapa worldview: that worldview provided, to Māori, the only available conceptual apparatus for making sense of their situation. 37 It is of course a broader historical contingency that this was the case, as it was that the Māori outlook took the shape it did at that time, but those contingencies do not bear on the point at hand. What matters is that it remains the case that the Māori perception of injustice in the early contact era was and could only have been shaped by the whakapapa worldview alone. mode of legitimation at the core of this tradition of political activity, because the current contingency of the whakapapa worldview is part of the Māori narrative of injustice and loss. This should be totally unsurprising, given how that contingency came about. Māori political activity is historically informed in such a way that it is no simple matter for Māori to abandon the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation in favour of some other mode that cannot accommodate the contents of the Māori mode. For Māori to do so would, for example, be to concede that previous generations of Māori in the struggle against colonisation were in the grip of an error about the nature of the injustice suffered. I find it extraordinarily hard to conceive how, in any argument that seeks fidelity with the ongoing Māori tradition of attempting to erase the injustices of colonisation, the distinctively Māori mode of legitimation could be abandoned.
What I hope is now clear is that, while it is the constellation of thick ethical concepts at the centre of the Māori mode of legitimation that makes it distinctively Māori, it is the political resonance of these concepts that keeps the mode to the fore in Māori political activity. Māori have a continual tradition of characterising the injustices of colonisation in these terms, which is itself sustained by the way in which the contingency of the whakapapa worldview is a part of the narrative of colonial injustice. These political resonances effectively foist onto Māori political activity a constellation of ethical concepts that bear the historical deposit of the traditional Māori form of life, but also bear the historical deposit of Māori attempts at making sense of and inhabiting postcolonial circumstances. The fact that the whakapapa mode of legitimation takes its terms from a constellation of concepts that now bear a far more complicated historical deposit than they did 300 years ago illuminates the incredibly complex question facing Māori of what they take the Māori worldview to be. While the current contingency of the whakapapa worldview is part of the Māori narrative of injustice, not all that was once in it but now lost is mourned. The whakapapa mode of legitimation is therefore at once outward-facing, used to legitimate claims of right in political engagement with Pākehā, and inward-facing -by which I mean it has an essential presence in debates among Māori about the shape and content of the whakapapa worldview.
I am now able to give an answer to the question of whether the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is reasonable. There is a real sense in which the whakapapa worldview remains a live option for Māori -it is not simply a conceptual last stand -and 20 the sense in which it is a live option is imbued with deep political significance for Māori. It is important that resentment is reasonable only under some conditions. The abolition of institutionalised racism in the American South, insofar as it has actually been abolished, is no doubt deeply resented by those racists who wish to, but can no longer, feasibly recover what they think of as a proper way of life (for instance, they seem very upset by the existence of interracial marriage). We would not want to say their resentment was reasonable. How we draw the line here should turn, in part, on whether we consider the resentment to be bound up in what is justifiably a history shaped by injustice. And that will involve doing some practical philosophy, giving a robust justification for the criteria of justice we're using when we draw that line.
For global justice theorists, the Southern racists' resentment will be straightforwardly unreasonable, because the racists' racism is thoroughly antithetical to the concerns grounding human rights. Things are different in the case of the colonised people asserting special natural rights, because the historical record of colonisation will itself typically create the conditions for reasonable resentment. Anyone whose reflection on questions of injustice is informed by the standard account of human rights should have no difficulty seeing histories of colonisation as cases where serious moral wrong has been done: that much is accessible, even if claims of special natural rights may sound more worrying. In the Māori case, the liberal history of New Zealand is also a history in which Māori suffer severe injustice, and this has proved sufficient to encourage the awkward navigation of the other side's constellation of thick concepts, and enables Pākehā to accept the Māori use of the whakapapa mode of legitimation.
I am not suggesting that this thin convergence of histories is, of itself, sufficient to vindicate the reasonableness of the Māori avoidance of human rights talk. It cannot be, because a convergence in thin concepts -both sides agree "wrong" was done -cannot dissolve the fact that the thick concepts Māori use to characterise the nature of the wrong are not part of the liberal social morality. What vindicates the reasonableness of the Māori avoidance of human rights talk is that any plausible reflection on questions of injustice or wrongdoing will also have to acknowledge the historical deposit embedded in the moral concepts we use to characterise the wrongs of colonisation. Such reflection must also acknowledge how, within ongoing political traditions of resistance to colonisation, that deposit is perceived to relate to the historical record. The current contingency of the worldview of whakapapa, and the political resonances of that contingency, is one such case in point. Kofi Quashigah's contribution to this symposium highlights another: the political resonance in post-colonial constitutional jurisprudence in sub-Saharan Africa of anything resembling the "repugnancy test" of the colonial era. 40 It makes neither good political nor good philosophical sense to think that it is a simple or justifiable matter to recast the colonised's claims of right into modern liberal concepts and categories. And this conclusion can be reached without taking any view on whether genealogical animism, or any other outlook, accurately reflects the absolute conception of reality.
A less uniform perspective on global injustice
The reader, at this juncture, may be wondering just how far one can generalise the point I am seeking to make. All the world is of course not New Zealand. And that fact may seem to severely undermine my starting hypothesis that there may be relevant connections between the Māori context and other post-colonial contexts; especially those contexts which are the primary concern of global justice theorists. Although Māori are severely disproportionately represented at the wrong end of every social welfare statistic in New Zealand, they are in global terms well-off members of a stable, transparent democratic society. It may seem that the Māori argument in terms of whakapapa rights is a luxury that is unaffordable in many post-colonial contexts, and likely that significant political resonance will attach to a mode of legitimation that draws its terms from that worldview. There will (almost?) invariably be a need for political argument in post-colonial contexts to make use of modes of legitimation that, like the Māori mode, take their shape from the traditional worldview.
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That need will arise, at least in part, from the task of vindicating the present and ongoing shape the traditional worldview is held to take. It is not clear to me how that task could possibly be sensibly separated from political activity, and one excellent illustration of this is Quashigah's nuanced discussion, in this symposium, of how modern African constitutionalism navigates the confrontations between traditional social morality and a social morality that is at once African and shaped by an 'imported external view of life '. 41 It may of course turn out that in many post-colonial contexts what can be vindicated as the local equivalent to the whakapapa worldview may be more conducive to human rights talk -albeit perhaps a reconceptualisation of human rights talk 42 -than the whakapapa worldview is. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of faith, and it is at least worth pausing to ask how well the human rights mode of legitimation fits with these traditionally-focussed modes, rather than rushing to assert the primacy of the human rights mode.
I have here advanced a very speculative point, but it does not strike me as one that is implausible. What does strike me is the way in which philosophical defences of human rights struggle to register this possibility. Thomas Pogge, unusually for the literature, is explicit about who he takes his audience to be: his argument only addresses 'affluent people everywhere... not because I see the poor as passive subjects rather than agents, but because I don't take myself to have any standing to advise them.' 43 I can see why Most other global justice theorists are far less explicit about who they take their audiences to be. My impression is that most take themselves to be addressing the inhabitants of the world at large under the conditions of modernity. Yet that domain is frequently idealised, with participants in the practices of liberal modernity assumed to accept something of its liberalism. To give one example from a cornerstone of the literature, Jim Griffin defends a consensus on human rights by invoking the 'massive increase in global communication, convergence on economic structures, homogenization of ways of life due to growing prosperity, and widespread travel and study abroad precisely by the persons most likely to be influential in their societies '. 44 This sort of idealised view is an unavoidable consequence of the justificatory strategy of appealing to the existence of a common substantive moral consensus. But it makes contemporary philosophical conceptions ill-equipped to account for the many ways in which the institutions of liberal capitalism are not so central to varied local forms of life that alternative constellations of ethical concepts are untenable.
The injustices in the global order that defenders of human rights highlight should put pressure on the assumption that reasonable modern individuals see these injustices in light of a concern with basic human rights. I would be very interested to know the extent to which the perception of these injustices, in post-colonial contexts of political activity, is inextricably bound up with the local history of colonisation, and with attempts at overcoming the continued effects and legacy of that history. It would not surprise me at all if, among bearers of local forms of life shaped by colonial impositions on culture, territory, and livelihood, the contemporary impacts of the unjust global order were viewed as continuations of the history of colonisation, to be cast within indigenous modes of legitimation. To the extent that this is the case, human rights talk is likely to represent, as it does for the Māori, an inappropriate mode of legitimation. That we struggle to register this possibility within philosophical justifications for human rights 44 Griffin, On Human Rights, 138. I should note that in Griffin's case, this appeal to agreement is one strand of a more complex justificatory cable: Griffin also offers a sophisticated argument about the intelligibility of certain basic values.
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invoking an assumed common consensus on moral value should also put pressure on the wisdom of such a justificatory strategy. * For helpful comments I am grateful to Martin Ajei, Rowan Cruft, Katrin Flikschuh, Adrian Haddock, Eghosa Osaghae, Avia Pasternak, Kofi Quashigah, Andrew Sharp, Ajume Wingo, and audiences at the ALSP, the LSE, and the University of Ghana.
